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 Abstract 
 The article discusses the gendered implications of recent political developments in the 
region. It argues that women and gender are key to both revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary processes and developments and not marginal to them. It explores the 
significance of women’s involvement, the historical context of women’s political 
participation and marginalization in political transition. Theoretically, developments in the 
region point to the centrality of women and gender when it comes to constructing and 
controlling communities, be they ethnic, religious or political; the significance of the state 
in reproducing, maintaining and challenging prevailing gender regimes, ideologies, 
discourses and relations; the instrumentalization of women’s bodies and sexualities in 
regulating and controlling citizens and members of communities; the prevalence of gender-
based violence; the historically and cross-culturally predominant construction of women as 
second-class citizens; the relationship between militarization and a militarized masculinity 
that privileges authoritarianism, social hierarchies and tries to marginalize and control not 
only women but also non-normative men. 
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 It has almost been impossible over the last few months to keep up with 
political developments in the Middle East: small scale demonstrations, and 
mass protests; revolutionary processes that not only involve the political 
sphere but that have also touched the social fabric; the ousting of several 
dictators; the brutal crackdown and killing of peaceful protesters; armed 
struggles, NATO involvement and wider debates about international inter-
vention; not to mention various forms of counter-revolutionary backlash 
and the struggles of old regimes to hold on to power. 
 1   This contribution is based on and developed from my inaugural lecture entitled ‘On Not 
Travelling Lightly: Transnational Feminist Journeys to and from the Middle East’, 18 May 
2011, SOAS, University of London. 
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 In the initial phase of these rapid changes and developments, I was fre-
quently asked: ‘Where are the women?’ The first images we saw of protests 
in Tunisia and Egypt were largely of men. Later on the images and the 
coverage of the protests changed and it became clear that women were 
involved at all levels. Individual women were given particular media atten-
tion: in Egypt, Asma Mahfouz became known by many as the ‘leader of the 
revolution’ after posting an online video calling young people to demon-
strate en masse, helping to spark the protests that forced President Hosni 
Mubarak’s resignation. In Bahrain, political activist Munira Fakhro played 
a leading role as an organizer and spokesperson for the Pearl Square dem-
onstrations, demanding government reform and building a movement that 
was ‘not Sunni, not Shia, but Bahraini’. In Yemen, human rights activist and 
journalist Tawakul Karman has protested nonviolently outside Sanaa 
University every Tuesday since May 2007, demanding that President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh step down from power. 
 Yet it was not just individual women—women participated side by side 
with men in the protests across the region. In light of western media repre-
sentations and widespread perceptions among the public in western coun-
tries that women in the region did not just appear on the scene in 2011, we 
should clarify: for decades they had been active members in trade unions, 
political opposition parties and more informal networks and organizations 
that were all instrumental in the recent political developments. Women 
have been very much involved in the virtual communities of bloggers 
and Facebook users. And during the height of the actual protests to oust 
Ben Ali and Mubarak, women of all generations and social classes were on 
the streets in large numbers. Notably in places like Tahrir Square in 
Cairo, where men and women mingled for weeks in extremely crowded 
and volatile situations, many Egyptian women reported that they had 
never felt as safe and been treated as respectfully as during the time of 
these protests. 
 Without doubt, it has been easier for women to participate in politics in 
Egypt, where the protest movement had initially taken an explicitly non-
violent character— silmiya —and where there exists a long history of large-
scale women’s political participation. Indeed, in Egypt and also in Iran, 
which to my mind should not be left out in current discussions about peo-
ple’s power and resistance, women activists have been spearheading civic 
rights, democracy and human rights movements in the context of their 
women’s rights struggles. My own work on the Egyptian women’s move-
ment in the mid-1990s revealed that women’s rights activists were engaged 
in contestations with the state about the shaping of gender policies as well 
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as wider issues of citizenship and social justice. To varying degrees, Egyptian 
women have engaged for a long time in grassroots activism and have 
aspired to find non-hierarchical ways of organizing, thereby engaging in 
the process of democratization. 
 Yet, even in the more socially conservative countries like Yemen, Libya, 
Bahrain and Syria—and they are all very different from each other—we 
find that women have increasingly pushed the boundaries of what is 
socially acceptable when joining the protests and making their own gen-
der-specific demands, in addition to joining in the wider calls for reforms, 
democratization, an end to corruption, political transparency and human 
rights. 
 It is not surprising that revolutionary processes should open up social 
and political spaces for women. History is full of comparable examples 
around the world. If we speak of the Middle East, the most commonly cited 
examples are the Egyptian anti-colonial and independence movement at 
the turn of the twentieth century that gave rise to the Egyptian women’s 
movement; the Algerian war of independence in the time of French colo-
nialism; and the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. 
 Yet, history also teaches us that during political transitions, women are 
regularly marginalized and tend to lose many of the gains they might have 
acquired, or have been promised, at the height of a revolutionary struggle. 
We see this development most clearly in the Egyptian context, where the 
institutionalization of the various aspects of the protest movement and 
political representation has not only been male-dominated but has also 
been controlled by the military. Here the issue is not only the lack or very 
limited representation of women in crucial transitional bodies, such as the 
constitutional review committee, but perhaps more significantly, we see 
women’s rights being actively violated and women’s and gender-based 
issues sidelined, occasionally even ridiculed, sometimes by women 
themselves. 
 Unfortunately all cross-cultural and historical evidence suggests that 
unless women explicitly insist on their gender-specific needs, rights 
and problems, these will be sidelined, ignored and swept under the carpet. 
I suggest that the failure to stress women’s specific demands within the 
respective wider struggles is a strategic mistake and will lead to history 
repeating itself. 
 Ironically, but again not surprisingly, we can see that women and gender 
issues are taking center stage in the old regimes’ attempts to hold on 
to power and privilege, and in the violent backlash and counter-revolution-
ary processes we have been witnessing recently. Egyptian women who 
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participated in demonstrations during International Women’s Day on 
8 March 2011 were harassed and accused of taking away attention from the 
main issues. Some men who attacked the female protesters claimed that 
they were seeking to destroy Egypt and undermine family values and the 
sanctity of the family by telling women to desert their husbands. In this 
instance it was obvious that the men surrounding them were divided into 
those who are threatened by a women’s bloc making their own demands 
and thereby challenging the prevailing gender order, and those who stood 
in solidarity with them, recognizing that the women’s demands were at the 
core of their own visions and ideas of a new Egypt. 
 The treatment of female protesters has taken on very different forms to 
that of their male counterparts. Harassment and brutalization by the 
police, the  mukhabarat , or secret police, and the army often has sexual con-
notations for women. Egyptian female protesters have been strip-searched; 
pictures have been taken while they were without clothes; they have been 
accused of prostitution and in some cases forced to undergo virginity test-
ing. Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh suggested in April 2011 that anti-
government protesters in the capital Sanaa were in violation of Islamic law 
because women were not allowed to mix with men. He engaged in smear 
campaigns on national TV implying that women in pro-change demonstra-
tions were ‘loose’. 
 The heart-wrenching case of Iman al-Obeidy, a Libyan woman from 
Benghazi who was raped by a group of military men loyal to Qaddafi, is a 
cruel reminder of the way rape is a commonly used weapon in warfare. 
Here rape is not only meant to violate and harm an individual woman, but 
it is a way to humiliate and violate entire communities. What made this 
case so different from the many others that go unreported is that Iman al-
Obeidy did not allow herself to be silenced by prevailing notions of shame 
and codes of honor. She went public, enabling the international media to 
widely circulate images of her anguish and terror. For me personally, most 
shocking in the scenes we saw broadcasted around the world were the 
Libyan women working in the hotel who tried to silence her, calling her a 
traitor and at some point throwing a coat over her face. Those images made 
crystal clear what we have known for many years but is still painful to 
watch and experience in practice: sisterhood is not global. It might not 
even be local. Women do not necessarily act in solidarity with each other, 
just because they are women. 
 In those places in which the protests or revolutionary developments 
have taken a largely militarized form, the gendered outcomes are from the 
outset problematic. The images of armed men fighting other armed men in 
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Libya are a huge cause for concern. Documented cases of female African 
migrant workers being raped in Tripoli and elsewhere by anti-Qaddafi 
forces might be individual instances of gender-based violence and human 
rights violation, however, given the frequently close relationship between 
the glorification of militarized masculinities and the increase in gender-
based violence, I am personally not very optimistic where gender relations 
in Libya are concerned. 
 The backlash against women in some current contexts also reminds us 
that women’s reliance on the state to champion and support gender equal-
ity and social justice is problematic. It has already become obvious—and 
I have seen it most clearly in the context of post-invasion developments in 
Iraq—that politicians and governments in the region have been prone to 
compromise women’s rights in order to shore up support among socially 
conservative constituencies. In Iraq, for example, the central as well as the 
Kurdish regional government have been side-lining gender-related issues 
in the context of negotiating political disputes, such as federalism, regula-
tion of oil and the status of Kirkuk. 
 Historically, regional women’s rights activists have been challenged to 
not be co-opted by the largely secular authoritarian state’s modernizing 
gender policies and forms of state feminism. When dealing with a dictator-
ship and a one-party system it is very difficult for women’s rights activists to 
operate independently outside given state structures. Yet, in the past 
authoritarian regimes have implemented measures to increase gender 
equality and social justice, as long as these were perceived to be harmless 
to the regime and the status quo. We have seen this most conspicuously in 
Tunisia and Iraq, but also to a lesser extent in Egypt, where many women’s 
rights activists collaborated with Suzanne Mubarak’s National Union for 
Women. An exaggerated belief in the ability of the state and the main polit-
ical party to promote women’s rights might seriously diminish women 
activists’ credibility and might limit their strategies and possible achieve-
ments in the long run. 
 Another cause of concern are Islamist constituencies whose gender pol-
itics are viewed with great anxiety by secular women and men across the 
region. At the height of the euphoria in the early phase of the Arab spring, 
I often argued with Iranian friends whose own revolutionary experiences 
made them rather sceptical and worried about recent developments in the 
region. A few months later, there is no doubt that Islamist groups are not 
only the best organized in terms of political parties but they also appear to 
be well placed to convince many people that they would provide a viable 
alternative to the previous secular authoritarian regimes. It is too early to 
assess their impact on the evolving situation, but it is already evident that 
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we have to recognize the variations and range of Islamist groups and their 
differing gender ideologies and visions. Analytically, it is important to con-
sider the specific historical and current context of specific Islamist parties 
and groups. Al-Nahda in Tunisia, for example, has, so far, gone out of its 
way to stress its commitment to women’s rights, which is very different 
from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. But even the Brotherhood appears 
moderate and favorable in comparison to the Salafis who increasingly 
claim their space on the political map in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. 
 Theoretically and politically, several issues emerge from these recent 
events: the centrality of women and gender when it comes to construct-
ing and controlling communities, be they ethnic, religious or political; the 
significance of the state in reproducing, maintaining and challenging pre-
vailing gender regimes, ideologies, discourses and relations; the instrumen-
talization of women’s bodies and sexualities in regulating and controlling 
citizens and members of communities; the prevalence of gender-based vio-
lence; the historically and cross-culturally predominant construction of 
women as second-class citizens; the relationship between militarization 
and a militarized masculinity that privileges authoritarianism, social hier-
archies and tries to marginalize and control not only women but also men, 
who by virtue of their class, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or politics do not 
fit into the image of the normative ‘ideal man’. 
 The various theoretical and political issues emerging in relation to 
recent processes and events in the Middle East illustrate what many of us 
have been narrating, documenting and analyzing over the past decades but 
what often remains misunderstood: A gendered lens is not just about 
women, even though in some contexts that continues to be an important 
and necessary focus of inquiry, as women are still systematically absent 
from official accounts, analyses and projected future scenarios. Yet zoom-
ing in on what happens to and is going on with femininities, masculinities 
and sexualities; to gender norms, ideologies and discourses as well as gen-
der roles and relations and the various processes of gendering within all 
aspects of social, cultural, political and economic lives tells us a great 
deal about the nature of and dynamics within the state, citizenship, civil 
society, the military, the economy, etc. When Cynthia Enloe famously and 
provocatively asked a few years ago whether gender might be the bigger 
picture, she was alluding to the way we can learn from a gendered lens 
about power, both the more oppressive top-down variety, but also the 
more subtle micro-politics of power; and we can learn about hierarchies 
and inequalities. A gendered lens also allows us to explore the various ways 
subjects are materially and discursively constituted and circumscribed, 
both at local and global levels. 
